To the Honorable Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives and the Honorable President and Members of the Senate.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We, the conferees appointed to confer over the disagreement between the two houses concerning House Bill No. 389 by Representative Pressly, recommend the following concerning the Reengrossed bill:

1. That the set of Senate Floor Amendments by Senator Connick (#3759) be rejected.

Respectfully submitted,

Representative  Thomas Alexander Pressly, IV  Senator  Barrow Peacock

Representative  Gregory A. Miller  Senator  Patrick Connick

Representative  Alan Seabaugh  Senator  Robert Mills
The digest printed below was prepared by House Legislative Services. It constitutes no part of the legislative instrument. The keyword, one-liner, abstract, and digest do not constitute part of the law or proof or indicia of legislative intent. [R.S. 1:13(B) and 24:177(E)]

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT DIGEST

HB 389 2022 Regular Session Pressly

Keyword and oneliner of the instrument as it left the House

PRESCRIPTION: Provides relative to emergency suspension of legal deadlines

Report rejects Senate amendments which would have:

1. Added a provision providing for a two-year prescription period for injuries sustained during the operation or control of a vehicle.

Digest of the bill as proposed by the Conference Committee

Present law (C.C. Art. 3447) provides that liberative prescription is a mode of barring actions as a result of inaction for a period of time.

Present law (C.C. Art. 3458) provides that peremption is a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right. Present law provides that unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the peremptive period.

Present law (C.C. Art. 3467) provides that prescription runs against all persons unless legislation establishes an exception.

Present law (C.C. Art. 3461) provides that peremption may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.

Proposed law changes present law and adds that the law may provide exceptions to present law.

Present law (C.C. Art. 3472.1) provides for the emergency suspension of prescription and peremption in the event that the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster pursuant to present law (R.S. 29:721-772; La. Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, National Guard Mutual Assistance Counter-Drug Activities Compact, and La. Health Emergency Powers Act).

Present law provides that if the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster, the La. Supreme Court may suspend all prescriptive and peremptive periods for up to 90 days.

Present law provides for continuing suspensions.

Present law provides that the suspension period will terminate upon the earlier of a supreme court order or termination of the declared state of emergency or disaster. Present law provides that the right to file any pleading subject to the suspension as provided in present law shall terminate 60 days after the suspension terminates.

Proposed law changes present law and provides that if the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster and issues an order that suspends or extends the liberative prescriptive and peremptive periods, the executive order or proclamation shall have the effect of suspending only those liberative prescriptive or peremptive periods that would have
otherwise accrued during the time specified in the order or duration of the order's effectiveness.

**Proposed law** provides that when the suspension period terminates, liberative prescription or peremption commences to run again and accrues upon the earlier of 30 days after the expiration of the period of suspension or in accordance with time as calculated in **present law** (C.C. Art. 3472).

**Present law** (C.C. Art. 3472) provides that when the suspension period terminates, liberative prescription or peremption commences to run again upon the termination of the period of suspension.

**Proposed law** (C.C.P. Art. 196.2) provides that when the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster pursuant to **present law** (R.S. 29:721-775), the supreme court, rather than the governor, may suspend or extend deadlines applicable to legal proceedings in court, including abandonment of actions.

**Present law** (C.C.P. Art. 561) provides that an action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for three years. An appeal is abandoned when parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or disposition or disposition for the period provided in the rules of the appellate court.

**Proposed law** (C.C.P. Art. 196.2) provides that the suspension or extension of deadlines applicable to legal proceedings shall only extend deadlines applicable to legal proceedings that would have otherwise accrued during the period of time in the order. After the suspension or extension period has expired, a party shall have an amount of time as specified in the court order to file any pleading affected by the suspension or extension. **Proposed law** provides that if no amount of time is specified, the parties shall have 30 days after the period has expired.

**Present law** (C.C.P. Art. 562) provides that when the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster pursuant to **present law** (R.S. 29:721-775) the supreme court may suspend the period of abandonment for a period of time not to exceed 90 days. **Present law** provides for continuing suspensions.

**Present law** provides that the suspension period will terminate upon the earlier of a supreme court order or termination of the declared state of emergency or disaster. **Present law** provides that the right to file any pleading subject to the suspension as provided in **present law** shall terminate 60 days after the suspension terminates.

**Proposed law** repeals **present law**.

(Amends C.C. Arts. 3461 and 3472.1; Adds C.C.P. Art. 196.2; Repeals C.C.P. Art. 562)